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This paper studies the interaction between time inconsistency problems in labor
market policy and monetary policy. When both policies are discretionary, there is
a positive inﬂation bias, whereas the bias in labor market programs may be either
positive or negative. A commitment of labor market programs to zero increases
inﬂation, as compared to the case when both labor market policy and monetary
policy are discretionary. Delegation of labor market policy to a liberal labor market
board may improve the discretionary outcome, even if labor market programs crowd
out regular employment. A conservative central bank always reduces the social loss,
even when monetary policy interacts with labor market policy.
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11 Introduction
In the last decade, Western Europe has experienced high and persistent rates of unem-
ployment, which has increased the interest in active labor market policy as a means of
reducing unemployment. This paper investigates how the time inconsistency problem
of labor market policy can arise and how this can interact with the time inconsistency
problem of monetary policy.
The time inconsistency problem of monetary policy has been thoroughly investigated.
According to Barro and Gordon (1983), the time-consistent rate of inﬂation is higher
than the rate to which the government can credibly commit. Similar time inconsistency
problems can be associated with an active labor market policy, but have not been subject
to any thorough analyses, which has been pointed out by Blanchﬂower, Jackman and
Saint-Paul (1995), and Calmfors (1995).
Active labor market policy can be split into three diﬀerent categories: (i)m e a s u r e s
to increase labor demand; (ii) measures to increase labor supply; and (iii)m e a s u r e st o
improve the matching process between vacancies and job searches. The overall eﬀect of
an active labor market policy is not, a priori, clear. Labor market policy may increase
employment by increasing the competition for jobs and putting downward pressure on
wages. It may also increase employment by moving workers from sectors with an excess
supply of labor to sectors with an excess demand for labor. But labor market policy might
also have adverse eﬀects on employment. If participation in labor market programs seems
more attractive than open unemployment, for instance due to a higher compensation level,
then programs may cause upward pressure on wages and thus reduce regular employment.
In Calmfors (1994), the eﬀects of labor market programs are analyzed and the conclusion
is that the aggregate eﬀect cannot be determined from theoretical reasoning only.
Active labor market policy in Sweden has been subject to several empirical and the-
oretical evaluations, most of which are micro studies of its eﬀects on individuals. The
number of evaluations of eﬀects on macroeconomics variables is lower (for an overview
see Calmfors, Forslund and Hemstr¨ om, 2001). One type of macroeconomic studies inves-
tigates the relation between wage setting and the size of active labor market programs,
henceforth denoted ALMPs. The ﬁndings in the time-series studies tend to be that an
expansion of ALMPs increases wage pressure and reduces employment (Calmfors, 1993).
Skedinger (1995), and Calmfors and Skedinger (1995), ﬁnd that job creation programs in
Sweden have negative eﬀects on regular employment, although several studies exploiting
cross-country variations show that ALMPs result in strong reductions in open unemploy-
2ment and, possibly, also in increases in regular employment (e.g. Layard et al., 1996;
Zetterberg 1993; Scarpetta, 1996). If job creation and training are distinguished, training
programs seem to have more favorable eﬀects on employment than job-creation programs
(Calmfors, 1994; Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995).
If ALMPs have adverse eﬀects on employment, the government has an incentive to hold
back their size in order not to increase the wage pressure. However, the announcement
of low ALMPs may not be credible, for once wages have been set, the government can
increase ALMPs to reduce open unemployment without risking wage increases. But, if
the private sector understands the incentives of policymakers, policies will be anticipated
and the wage will increase and the outcome may be discretionary with too high wages,
too large ALMPs and too low employment. ALMPs then suﬀer from a time-inconsistency
problem similar to the one of monetary policy, with which we are familiar.
If ALMPs have a wage-reducing eﬀect, the discretionary equilibrium may instead
i n v o l v et o os m a l lA L M P s .O n c ew a g e sh a v eb e e nd e t e r m i n e d ,t h eg o v e r n m e n t ’ si n c e n t i v e
to stick to announced large ALMPs is weakened, because the budget cost of programs
can be reduced, by cutting the size without aﬀecting the wage contracts. Since this is
recognized by the private sector, wages will not be held back and the economy then ends
up in a situation with too small ALMPs, too high wages and too low regular employment.
The purpose of this paper is to formalize the time inconsistency problem for ALMPs
and to study the interaction between the time inconsistency problems for monetary policy
and active labor market policy. I shall also analyze delegation to independent agencies
and commitment to simple rules for both monetary policy and labor market policy, when
regarded as methods of solving the time-inconsistency problems. In the case of monetary
policy, an example of such a simple rule would be to enter the European monetary union
(EMU). In the case of labor market policy, a country could refrain from setting up the
necessary institutional framework for such policies.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, the time inconsistency problem for
both monetary policy and labor market policy is analyzed. Section 3 studies commitment
to simple rules for money growth and ALMPs. Section 4 analyzes delegation of monetary
policy and labor market policy to independent agencies. Section 5 concludes.
32 A model for the time-inconsistency problems of
monetary policy and labor market policy
In this section, I set up a one-period model. Assume that the government’s preferences














rt is the fraction of the labor force participating in ALMPs, ut is the fraction that is
openly unemployed and πt is the inﬂation rate. λ0 and λ1 are positive weights on ALMPs
and open unemployment. Open unemployment and inﬂation are standard arguments in
the objective function in the monetary literature. The reason for including ALMPs is that
increased ALMPs at a given rate of open unemployment imply lower regular employment,
which is disliked by the government. The workers are likely to associate diﬀerent levels
of utility with open unemployment and ALMPs, and the two alternatives may cause the
government diﬀerent budget costs. Accordingly, I enter open unemployment and ALMPs
as separate arguments in the loss function, rather than as a sum. In the loss function,
the target values for ALMPs, open unemployment and inﬂation are set at zero. This is a
normalization to simplify the model.
My unemployment equation can be derived from a simple model with a labor-demand
relationship and a wage-setting equation. Labor demand follows from proﬁt maximization
of ﬁrms, which hire labor until the marginal product equals the real wage. With a constant
labor-demand elasticity, employment can be written as a function of the real wage and a
supply shock in the following way
lognt = θ − γ (logWt − logPt)+εt. (2)
nt is the fraction of the labor force that is regularly employed, Wt is the nominal wage,
Pt is the price level, γ is the constant labor demand elasticity, εt is a supply shock and θ
is a positive constant.
Open unemployment is deﬁned as
ut =1− rt − nt. (3)
Assume the following wage-setting equation
logWt − logP
e




t is the expected price level, re
t is the expected size of ALMPs and β0 is a positive
constant. The wage-setting equation can be considered as derived from a wage-bargaining
model or an union wage-setting model. In these models, it can be shown that wages de-
pend on the welfare of a laid-oﬀ worker. The value of this outside opportunity can be
taken to depend on the size of ALMPs, because this size determines the probability of a
laid-oﬀ worker participating in a program. One possible mechanism is that participation
in ALMPs reduces the welfare loss of being unemployed, because the compensation in pro-
grams is higher than the unemployment beneﬁt (Calmfors and Forslund, 1991). ALMPs
may also generate other positive welfare eﬀects for the unemployed, such as psychological
well-being (Korpi, 1994). If so, larger ALMPs tend to improve the outside opportunity
for the unemployed and thus increase the wage pressure. Another possibility is that par-
ticipation in ALMPs is welfare-decreasing compared to open unemployment due to the
reduction in leisure time. This assumes that participation in ALMPs is not voluntary but
rather a way of making the willingness to work a condition for receiving unemployment
beneﬁts (Jackman, 1994). In this case, larger ALMPs should be expected to decrease the
wage pressure. This may also occur if participation in ALMPs increases the competition
for jobs, by preventing the unemployed from leaving the labor force. Depending on which
eﬀects are the strongest, β1 may thus be positive or negative.
As wage contracts are concluded for a coming period, the private sector must form
expectations about future ALMPs and the price level at the time when wages are set.
Hence, the expected price level and the expected size of ALMPs enter as arguments in
(4). To simplify, I assume away mobility between diﬀerent sectors, i.e., the probability of
ﬁnding a job in another sector if a worker is laid oﬀ is assumed to be zero, so that aggregate
employment does not enter in (4). Unemployment compensation or compensation in
ALMPs are regarded as constant in my analysis and accordingly, do not enter in (4)
either.
Rewrite (4) as
logWt − logPt = β0 + β1r
e
t − (logPt − logP
e
t ),
and combine it with (2) to get
lognt = θ − γβ0 − γβ1r
e




lognt =l o g ( 1− (rt + ut)) ≈−(rt + ut),
5Ic a nw r i t e
ut = α0 − α1r
e
t − γ (pt − p
e
t) − rt − εt,
where α0 = γβ0 − θ and α1 = −γβ1. pt and pe
t denote logarithms of the price level
and the expected price level. For the model to be useful, 0 < α0 < 1 must hold. This
means that the open unemployment rate must be between zero and one, if expectations
are correct and there are no ALMPs and supply shocks. α1 measures the eﬀect of ALMPs
on open unemployment. The sign of α1 is unclear, since ALMPs may aﬀect employment
through mechanisms working in diﬀerent directions, as discussed above. α1 < 0m e a n s
crowding-out eﬀects on employment of ALMPs and α1 > 0 crowding-in eﬀects. I shall
assume that α1 > −1, since this is a consistent ﬁnding in the empirical studies (see e.g.
Zetterberg, 1993; Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995; Forslund and Krueger, 1995; Skedinger,
1995; Layard, et al. 1996; Scarpetta, 1996). Crowding-out eﬀects might naturally be
associated with job-creation programs and crowding-in eﬀects with training programs, as
empirical studies tend to indicate that the former have negative and the latter positive
eﬀects on employment.1
Since πt −πe
t = pt −pt−1−(pe
t − pt−1)=pt −pe
t, I can rewrite open unemployment as
ut = α0 − α1r
e
t − γ (πt − π
e
t) − rt − εt, (5)
where πe
t is the expected inﬂation rate.
Assume that the government does not control inﬂation directly, but instead controls
a policy instrument, that is, money growth, which aﬀects inﬂation according to
πt = mt + vt, (6)
where mt is money growth and vt is a demand or ”velocity” shock. Shocks εt and vt are
i.i.d., with an expected value of zero and known variances of σ2
ε and σ2
v. The government
has private information about shocks εt and vt, and it can observe the realization of the
shocks before making any decisions, while the private sector does not have access to such
information when setting the wages. This introduces a potential role for stabilization of
shocks with monetary and labor market policy.








1 A possible explanation is that training programs are more eﬀective than job-creation programs for
increasing the skills of the unemployed and hence their competitiveness. Another explanation is that the
compensation in job-creation programs is usually higher than the compensation in training programs.
6where Et−1 denotes expectations conditional on information in period t − 1. I use (6) to
rewrite the rational expectation of inﬂation as
π
e




t is the rational expected money growth.
I shall assume that monetary policy and ALMPs are determined at the same time, i.e.,
monetary policy can not be determined after having observed ALMPs, or vice versa. This
assumption seems natural since both monetary policy and ALMPs can react to shocks with
short lags. This is a standard assumption with respect to monetary policy. For Sweden, it
has been shown that ALMPs are very ﬂexible in response to cyclical conditions (Ohlsson,
1992, 1993).
2.1 Commitment
Precommitment to an optimal rule is unrealistic, since it is diﬃcult to enforce. Still, the
solution is here considered as a benchmark. The timing under commitment is thus: (i)t h e
government announces rules for ALMPs and money growth before wages, employment,
expectations of ALMPs and money growth are determined and shocks are revealed. This
means that the government internalizes the eﬀect of its policy decisions on private-sector
expectations. (ii) The private sector sets wages and employment on basis of information
in period t−1, without observing shocks εt and νt, i.e., private agents form expectations
over re
t and me
t.( iii)T h ev a l u e so fvt and εt are observed by the government; (iv)
money growth and ALMPs are simultaneously implemented according to the rules and
(v) macroeconomic outcomes are realized.
The policy problem is viewed as a once-and-for-all choice of the rules before any
private-sector decisions are made.






s.t ut = α0 − rt − α1r
e
t − γ (πt − π
e
t) − εt,







where Et−1 denotes that the policy rules must be chosen before the realization of the
shocks are observed. The minimization is done as if the government could actually control
7private-sector expectations of ALMP and money growth as well as the actual size of
programs and money growth, due to the fact that the choice of policy rules are made
before the private-sector sets wages and thus forms expectations of πe
t and re
t.













t − Et−1rt) − θ2,t−1 (π
e
t − Et−1πt).
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to rt is
λ0rt − λ1ut + θ1,t−1 =0 , (9)
and the ﬁrst-order condition for re
t is
−α1λ1Et−1ut − θ1,t−1 =0 . (10)
θ1,t−1 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint of rational expectations of
ALMP. I can eliminate the multiplier θ1,t−1 by combining (9) and (10). This gives
λ0rt − λ1ut − α1λ1Et−1ut =0 . (11)
The ﬁrst term in (11) is the direct cost of an increase in ALMPs and the second term is the
marginal beneﬁt of a reduction in open unemployment for given re
t. The third term is the
marginal loss (beneﬁt) of an increase (decrease) in open unemployment when re
t increases
(depending on whether there are crowding-out or crowding-in eﬀects of ALMPs).
The ﬁrst-order condition for mt is
−γλ1ut + πt + θ2,t−1 =0 , (12)
and the ﬁrst-order condition for me
t is
γλ1Et−1ut − θ2,t−1 =0 . (13)
θ2,t−1 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint of rational expectations of
money growth. Again, I can substitute for the multiplier, which gives
−γλ1ut + πt + γλ1Et−1ut =0 . (14)
The ﬁrst term in (14) is the marginal beneﬁt of a decrease in open unemployment when
inﬂation increases for given expectations. The second term is the direct cost of an increase
in inﬂation, and the third term is the marginal cost of an increase in open unemployment
when the expected inﬂation increases.
8From (11) and (5), I get:
λ0rt −λ1α0 +λ1rt +α1λ1r
e








t =0 . (15)
I take expectations at t − 1 of (15), assuming that the expected value of εt is zero and




λ1α0 (1 + α1)
λ0 + λ1 (1 + α1)
2. (16)
Combining (15) and (16) gives a structural decision rule for ALMP as a function of




λ1α0 (1 + α1)










If (6) is substituted into (17), I can rewrite the decision rule for ALMPs in terms of




λ1α0 (1 + α1)













The ﬁrst term is the expected size of ALMPs, which depends on the parameters of
the model. The second and third term capture the stabilization of demand and supply
shocks respectively. When the economy is hit by a positive demand shock, unanticipated
inﬂation increases for a given mt. This reduces open unemployment and thus the need for
ALMPs. A positive supply shock increases employment and reduces open unemployment
and the need for ALMPs. The fourth term shows that if actual money growth is higher
than expected, it is optimal to reduce ALMPs, when actual money growth is higher than
expected, there will be unexpected inﬂation. Then open unemployment decreases.
(5) and (14) together give:
γλ1rt + γ
2λ1 (πt − π
e
t)+γλ1εt + πt − γλ1r
e
t =0 . (19)
To solve for expected money growth, I take expectations at t − 1 of (19) and obtain
Et−1πt =0 .
Using (6), I can solve for expected money growth as
Et−1 (mt + vt)=0 .
Hence, expected money growth is equal to
m
e
t = Et−1mt =0 . (20)
9I can rewrite the ﬁrst-order condition for money growth, (19), by inserting the expression
for inﬂation, (6), and expected money growth equal to zero. Then, the structural decision
rule for money growth can be written as









Optimal money growth is negatively dependent on demand shocks, supply shocks, and
deviations from expected ALMP. The ﬁrst term shows stabilization of demand shocks. A
positive demand shock tends to increase inﬂation. Money growth is then reduced to fully
oﬀset the increase in inﬂation.
The second term represents stabilization of supply shocks. A positive supply shock
increases employment and reduces open unemployment. The incentive to inﬂate is then
weakened and money growth is lowered. Money growth only stabilizes supply shocks
partially.
The third term captures the fact that if the actual size of ALMPs is higher than
expected by the private sector, money growth is reduced. If actual ALMPs are higher
than expected, open unemployment falls and weakens the incentive to create inﬂation.
Finally, I combine the structural rules for money growth and ALMP to solve for the
reduced forms of the decision rules. First, I insert the decision rule for ALMPs, (18), the
expected size of ALMPs, (16), and expected money growth equal to zero into the decision




t = −vt −
γλ1λ0
γ2λ1λ0 + λ0 + λ1
εt. (22)
When the government can commit policy, expected money growth cannot reduce unem-
ployment, since it cannot create any inﬂationary surprises. In the absence of shocks,
money growth is thus zero. The ﬁrst term in (22) shows that money growth entirely
stabilizes demand shocks. Since there is no goal conﬂict between inﬂation and open un-
employment. When demand shocks are stabilized by money growth so that inﬂation is
held at the target rate, open unemployment is also stabilized. The second term in (22)






γ2λ1λ0 + λ0 + λ1
εt.
Expected inﬂation is equal to the ”target rate” of zero. Any inﬂation in this equilibrium
is unexpected and occurs when the government exploits its informational advantage in
order to stabilize shocks.
10I substitute the structural rule for money growth, (21), and expected money growth
equal to zero into the decision rule for ALMPs, (18) in a similar way. Then, I simplify by




λ1α0 (1 + α1)
λ0 + λ1 (1 + α1)
2 −
λ1
γ2λ1λ0 + λ0 + λ1
εt. (23)
The ﬁrst term is the expected size of ALMPs, and the second term is the eﬀect of supply
shocks on ALMPs. A positive supply shock increases employment and reduces open
unemployment. Therefore, there is less need for ALMPs and their size is reduced. The
reduction is only a fraction of the shock however, so that there is only partial stabilization
of supply shocks. ALMPs do not stabilize demand shocks, since they are fully stabilized
by money growth.
In practice, there might be corner solutions with rt = 0, in case of large positive supply
shocks or large positive demand shocks, since large shocks decrease open unemployment
and may therefore entirely eliminate the need for ALMPs. To simplify, I shall only look
at interior solutions. I must then impose restrictions on the distribution of the shocks







λ0 + λ1 (1 + α1)
2 −
λ0
γ2λ1λ0 + λ0 + λ1
εt.
It is thus negatively dependent on supply shocks, but unaﬀected by demand shocks (be-
cause monetary policy fully stabilizes the latter).





λ0 + λ1 (1 + α1)
2´
− λ1α0 (1 + α1) − α0λ0
λ0 + λ1 (1 + α1)
2 +
λ1 + λ0
γ2λ1λ0 + λ0 + λ1
εt.
Accordingly, labor market and monetary policies are used to stabilize supply shocks. Alto-
gether, there is only partial stabilization of supply shocks, since both open unemployment
and employment are aﬀected by supply shocks.
Finally, I evaluate the one-period expected loss under commitment as
V






λ0 + λ1 (1 + α1)
2 +
λ1λ0






2 More speciﬁcally, the restriction on the shocks is (εt + γvt) <
α0(λ0+λ1)
(λ0+λ1(1+α1)). The condition is from
section 3.1, which gives the most restrictive condition for the cases studied here. The condition ensures
that ALMPs are always positive in these cases. The condition also ensures that open unemployment is
always positive.
112.2 Discretion
Next, consider the more realistic discretionary case. The government cannot commit to
the policy rules. Instead, ex post it can be optimal for the government to deviate from
the announced rules in order to reduce open unemployment. The timing under discretion
is thus: (i) the private sector determines wages and employment without knowing either
the realization of the supply and demand shocks, or the size of ALMPs and the rate
of money growth, i.e., they must form expectations of re
t and me
t.( ii)T h ev a l u e so fvt
and εt are observed by the government; (iii) money growth and ALMPs are decided and
implemented simultaneously after the formation of private-sector expectations and (iv)
macroeconomic outcomes are realized.
The equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium, i.e., the government’s choice of policy is the
best response to the private-sector’s choice of wages, and the private-sector’s choice is the
best response to the government’s choice.
The government’s minimization problem under discretion is
min
rt,mt L,
s.t ut = α0 − rt − α1r
e
t − γ (πt − π
e
t) − εt,
πt = mt + vt.
The diﬀerence from commitment is that the government does not internalize the eﬀects
of its policy on private-sector expectations. Instead, re
t and me
t are treated as given.













The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to rt is
λ0rt − λ1ut =0 . (24)
The ﬁrst-order condition for mt is
−γλ1ut + πt =0 . (25)
In (24), the marginal beneﬁt (loss) of a decrease (increase) in open unemployment due to
an increase in re
t does not enter the ﬁrst-order condition as in (11). The marginal cost of
an increase in open unemployment when me
t i n c r e a s e sd o e sn o te n t e r( 2 5 )a si n( 1 4 ) .
If I combine (24) and (5) this gives the ﬁrst-order condition as
λ0rt − λ1α0 + λ1rt + α1λ1r
e
t + γλ1 (πt − π
e
t)+λ1εt =0 . (26)





λ0 + λ1 (1 + α1)
. (27)



































As under commitment the optimal size of ALMPs under discretion thus depends nega-
tively on supply shocks, demand shocks, deviations from expected money growth and on
a constant. The second, third and fourth terms are the same as under commitment. The
only diﬀerence is the ﬁrst term, i.e. the expected (average) size of ALMPs.
Next, I solve for the decision rule for money growth. I begin with substituting the
expression for open unemployment, (5), into the ﬁrst-order condition for money growth,
(25), which gives
−γλ1α0 + γλ1rt + γλ1α1r
e
t + γ
2λ1 (πt − π
e
t)+γλ1εt + πt =0 . (30)
To solve for expected money growth, I take expectations of (30) at t − 1. The ﬁrst-order
condition then simpliﬁes to
Et−1πt = γλ1α0 − (γλ1α1 + γλ1)Et−1rt. (31)
I can solve for expected money growth by inserting the expression for inﬂation, (6), into
(31). Hence, expected money growth can be written as
m
e
t = Et−1mt = γλ1α0 − (γλ1α1 + γλ1)r
e
t. (32)
To solve for the structural decision rule for money growth, I combine (6), (8), (30) and
(32). Then I obtain the structural rule as
m
d









t) − γλ1 (1 + α1)r
e
t.
13The second, third and fourth terms are the same as under commitment. The ﬁrst
and the ﬁfth terms are diﬀerent. The diﬀerences arise because the government decides
on money growth, without considering the eﬀect on private-sector expectations. The ﬁrst
term is a positive constant, i.e., a positive bias in money growth. The ﬁfth term shows
that the expected size of ALMPs now also aﬀects money growth. When the expected size
of ALMPs increases, open unemployment falls in both the crowding-in and crowding-out
case (because of the assumption of α1 > −1 in the latter case). The incentive to inﬂate
in order to reduce open unemployment is thus weakened and money growth is decreased.
The intuition behind the other terms is the same as under commitment.
The reduced form rules of money growth and ALMP are found by combining the
structural decision rules for ALMP and money growth. First, I combine (27), (29), (32)






λ0 + λ1 (1 + α1)
− vt −
γλ1λ0
γ2λ1λ0 + λ0 + λ1
εt. (34)
The diﬀerence from commitment is found in the ﬁrst term, i.e. expected money growth,
where expected money growth is no longer equal to zero. This is due to the fact that
the government has an incentive to increase money growth in order to create surprise
inﬂation to reduce open unemployment. The second term shows that money growth still
fully stabilizes demand shocks. It is always optimal to fully stabilize demand shocks to
keep inﬂation at the target. The third term captures the partial stabilization of supply
shocks through monetary policy, which is the same as under commitment.





λ0 + λ1 (1 + α1)
−
γλ1λ0
γ2λ1λ0 + λ0 + λ1
εt. (35)
The expected inﬂation rate, i.e., the ﬁrst term in (35), is no longer zero. The inﬂation bias
is always positive but its size is aﬀected by whether there are crowding-out or crowding-in











λ0 + λ1 (1 + α1)
> 0.
Money growth fully stabilizes demand shocks and inﬂation is unaﬀected by demand
shocks. The second term in (35) shows that variations in inﬂation partially stabilize
supply shocks.
Finally, the reduced form of ALMP is derived by combining (27), (29), (32) and (34).





λ0 + λ1 (1 + α1)
−
λ1
γ2λ1λ0 + λ0 + λ1
εt. (36)
The ﬁrst term is the expected size of ALMPs and the second term represents the partial
stabilization of supply shocks. The diﬀerence from commitment is found in the ﬁrst term.











(λ0 + λ1 (1 + α1))
³
λ0 + λ1 (1 + α1)
2´.
(i) For crowding-out eﬀects, the size of ALMPs is larger under discretion, i.e., there
is a positive bias, due to the fact that the government no longer internalizes the eﬀect of
its policy on private-sector expectations.
(ii)F o rc r o w d i n g - i ne ﬀects, there is a negative bias in ALMP and the government sets
the size of ALMPs at a too low level under discretion, since ALMPs create a positive
externality on employment, but the government does not internalize this eﬀect.
It is optimal to stabilize supply shocks with ALMPs to the same extent as under
commitment. This result is independent of whether there are crowding-in or crowding-
out eﬀects of ALMPs.





λ0 + λ1 (1 + α1)
−
λ0
γ2λ1λ0 + λ0 + λ1
εt. (37)
The ﬁrst term is expected open unemployment and the second term is the eﬀect of supply










α0λ1λ0α1 (1 + α1)
³
λ0 + λ1 (1 + α1)
2´
(λ0 + λ1 (1 + α1))
.
(i) For crowding-out eﬀects, open unemployment is lower under discretion than under
commitment. ALMPs have two eﬀects on open unemployment. The ﬁrst direct eﬀect
reduces open unemployment, since the size of ALMPs is larger under discretion than
under commitment. Second, ALMPs reduce regular employment and increase open un-
employment. However, the total eﬀect is a decrease in open unemployment, since the
crowding-out eﬀe c ti sl e s st h a no n e - t o - o n e .
(ii) For crowding-in eﬀects, open unemployment is higher under discretion than under
commitment. First, open unemployment directly decreases with the size of ALMP. Sec-
ond, ALMPs increase regular employment and decrease open unemployment. The two
15eﬀects then work in the same direction, i.e., to increase open unemployment, since the
size of ALMPs is lower under discretion than under commitment.
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The ﬁrst term is expected employment. The second term, which shows the eﬀect of supply
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(i) For crowding-out eﬀects, ALMPs reduce regular employment. Since ALMPs are
larger under discretion than under commitment, employment is then smaller. The eﬀect
of the larger size of ALMPs under discretion is accordingly a reduction in open unem-
ployment, but at a cost of lower regular employment.
(ii) For crowding-in eﬀects, ALMPs increase regular employment. Under discretion,
the size of ALMPs is lower than under commitment and therefore employment is lower
under discretion.
The expected loss under discretion is
V
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In the sections above, I analyzed the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy
and active labor market policy. In the two following sections, I shall study commitment
to simple rules and delegation of policies to independent agencies as means of improving
the discretionary outcome in section 2.2.
3 Commitment to simple rules
The government would achieve higher utility if the time inconsistency problems for la-
bor market policy and monetary policy under discretion could be eliminated. If it were
possible to credibly commit both monetary policy and labor market policy in the way
16discussed in section 2.1, the situation would clearly improve. This might not be possible
however. Instead, the government may only be able to commit to very simple rules, and
t h eq u e s t i o ni st h e ni ft h ed i s c r e t i o n a r yo u t c o m ec a nb ei m p r o v e du p o ni nt h i sw a y .
I nt h ec a s eo fm o n e t a r yp o l i c y ,s u c has i m p l er u l em i g h tb et oj o i nt h eE M U .T h i s
could be interpreted as a given rate of money growth decided by the European Central
Bank, ECB, which does not adjust to domestic shocks.
In the case of ALMPs, a country could choose to abstain from setting up the insti-
tutional framework required for such programs (in terms of both labor-market training
and job-creation measures). Sweden with its National Labor Market Board (AMS) at the
country level to organize labor market policy is a country with an extensive active labor
market policy. At the regional level, there are employment oﬃces performing placement
services to improve the matching process and providing diﬀerent training schemes and job
creation measures for the unemployed. The U.S which has very little active labor market
policy and weak institutions for this might be a polar case.
3.1 Commitment to a simple money growth rule or entering the
EMU
This section analyzes commitment to a simple rule of money growth. A possible inter-
pretation of such commitment is participation in the monetary union, where the ECB
decides monetary policy. The consequence is that the only stabilization tool in case of
domestic shocks is then labor market policy.
The timing of the events is as follows: (i) the government announces a credible rule
for money growth (enters the EMU); (ii) private agents form expectations of re
t and me
t;
(ii)t h ev a l u e so fvt and εt are observed by the government; (iv) ALMPs are decided and
implemented and (v) macroeconomic outcomes are realized.
Assume that the government can commit money growth to zero in each period. Inﬂa-
tion is then
πt = vt. (38)
The government decides on the size of ALMPs in a discretionary way. Thus, the problem
is to decide the size of ALMPs such that the actual loss is minimized, subject to the open
unemployment equation (5), and the inﬂation equation (38).
The ﬁrst-order condition for rt is equal to (26). To solve for the expected size of
ALMPs, I insert the equation for inﬂation, (38), into the ﬁrst-order condition and take
expectations at t−1. This results in (27), i.e., the expected size of ALMP when both mon-
17etary policy and ALMP are determined in a discretionary way. After some simpliﬁcations,
the expression for ALMPs becomes
b rt =
λ1α0



















The expected size of ALMPs and the expected rate of open unemployment are the same
as when both ALMPs and monetary policy were determined in a discretionary way. The
simple rule removes the average inﬂation bias, since money growth is ﬁxed, but leaves the
bias in ALMP unaﬀected.
The third term in (39) shows that ALMPs stabilize supply shocks more under the sim-
ple rule than when both monetary policy and ALMP were determined in a discretionary
way, i.e., the coeﬃcient before the supply shock, εt, is now larger. The explanation is
that when money growth is ﬁxed, ALMPs substitute for monetary policy in stabilization
policy.
The third term in (40) is the eﬀect of supply shocks on open unemployment. The
coeﬃcient in front of εt is larger under the simple rule than when policies were determined
in a discretionary way. This means that open unemployment is more variable when money
growth is ﬁxed.
Since monetary policy can no longer be used in stabilization policy, demand shocks are
then stabilized with ALMPs. This is shown by the second term in (39). Earlier, monetary
policy fully stabilized demand shocks and they had no eﬀect on open unemployment.
But labor-market policy does not completely stabilize demand shocks in the case with
monetary-policy commitment.
When there is only one instrument available to the government, the total stabilization
of shocks in the economy is lower than when it can use two instruments. The reason is
that with two instruments, the government can equalize the cost of stabilizing shocks at
the margin.
The expected loss under a simple money growth rule is












































If the government achieves a lower expected loss from the simple rule than when both
policies are determined in a discretionary way or not depends on parameters of the model,
18but also on the variance of the supply and demand shocks. Comparing the expected losses
gives
V



























The eﬀects on utility work in diﬀerent directions when there is commitment to zero money
growth. There is a positive utility eﬀect from eliminating the inﬂation bias, but there is
an e g a t i v ee ﬀect from less stabilization of shocks. Accordingly it is diﬃcult to draw any
conclusions from (41), since the ﬁrst term is positive while the others are negative. I
shall, however, evaluate the expected losses for speciﬁc values of the parameters in the
model. The variance of the supply shock is taken from Lindblad’s (1997) estimation of
a similar speciﬁcation and it is 0.0002. The variance of the demand (velocity) shock is
calculated from data on inﬂation and money growth for Sweden from Findata’s database
Trust for the period 1979 − 1997. The value I use is 0.0007. The parameter α0 measures
open unemployment under perfect expectations and in the absence of ALMPs and shocks.
Iu s et h ev a l u e s0 .05 and 0.1. Empirical studies ﬁnd diﬀerent results for the labor de-
mand elasticity. Hammermesh (1996) concludes that the long-run constant-output labor
demand elasticity probably lies in the interval [0.15−0.75] and that the best guess is 0.3.
But I allow for output to change as the cost of labor changes so I must add the scale eﬀect
to obtain the total labor-demand elasticity. The value I use is 0.8. Society’s weights on
open unemployment and inﬂation are picked arbitrarily. In Table 1, the average values
of ALMPs, inﬂation and open unemployment under discretionary policy for both labor
market and monetary policy are shown for these parameter values.3 The ﬁrst numerical
example might have reﬂected Sweden in the 1970’s and the second example might have
been a hypothetical Sweden during the 1990’s, if monetary policy had not been conducted
by an inﬂation targeting central bank.
When monetary policy follows the simple rule and labor market policy is discretionary,
the average values are the same as when both labor market and monetary policy are
discretionary except for average inﬂation, which is zero.
As can be seen from Table 2, it is unclear whether commitment of monetary policy
improves welfare. It depends on whether the beneﬁt of eliminating the average inﬂation
3 If I assume the supply shock to be rectangularly (or continuously uniformly) distributed on the
interval [−0.024, 0.024], this gives E (εt)=0a n dσ2
ε ≈ 0.0002. If I also assume that the demand shock is
continuously uniformly distributed on the interval [−0.046, 0.046], this gives E (vt)=0a n dσ2
v ≈ 0.0007.
Then (εt + γvt) is continuously uniformly distributed with E (εt + γvt)=0a n dvar(εt + γvt) ≈ 0.0006
on the interval [−0.042, 0.042]. These intervals are consistent with interior solutions for ALMPs and open
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Table 1: Average values of ALMPs, inﬂation and open unemployment when both policies are determined
in a discretionary way.
bias outweighs the cost of less eﬀective stabilization of shocks. As I increase the crowding-
out eﬀects of ALMPs, monetary policy commitment is more likely to be better, due to
the fact that both the bias in ALMPs and inﬂation increases with the crowding-out eﬀect,
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Table 2: The lowest expected loss from a comparison of the outcome under a rule for monetary policy
and discretionary labor market policy with discretionary policy for both policies.
If the variances of the demand and supply shock are increased ten times, then the
expected loss is always less if both monetary and labor market policies are discretionary,
i.e., monetary policy commitment is welfare decreasing.
If the constant money-growth rule is interpreted as membership in the EMU, it might
be claimed that I have given this case an unfair treatment. When I assume that monetary
policy does not stabilize any shocks in this case, I have implicitly assumed that all shocks
are country speciﬁc. However, some shocks may be common for all countries in the EMU
and are therefore stabilized by the common monetary policy. My results are thus more
favorable for the EMU case than one might at ﬁrst believe, as a commitment of monetary
policy in several cases still turns out more favorably than the alternative.
203.2 A simple rule for ALMPs — no institutions for labor market
policy
A credible commitment of active labor market policy could be to abstain from setting up
an institutional framework for ALMPs. If a country has already invested in the required
institutions, it is less costly to deviate from the announced size of ALMP. However, for
a country like the US, which has not invested in such a framework, a commitment to
zero program is credible, since the institutions for ALMPs would have to be set up if
policymakers were to deviate.
T h et i m i n gi nt h i sc a s ei s ;( i) the government announces a credible rule for ALMPs,
that is, no institutions for ALMPs are set up; (ii) private agents form expectations of re
t
and me
t;( iii)t h ev a l u e so fvt and εt are observed by the government; (iv)m o n e yg r o w t h
is decided; and (v) macroeconomic outcomes are realized.
In this case, open unemployment is
ut = α0 − γ (πt − π
e
t) − εt. (42)
The government determines money growth in a discretionary way, as in section 2.2. Thus,
the problem is to decide on money growth such that the actual loss is minimized, subject
to the inﬂation equation (6), and the open unemployment equation (42). The ﬁrst-order
condition for money growth is equal to (25) which is the ﬁrst-order condition under
discretionary policy for both money growth and ALMPs. If I insert open unemployment,
(42), and the expression for inﬂation, (6), into the ﬁrst-order condition for money growth,
Io b t a i n
−γλ1α0 + γ
2λ1 (mt + vt − m
e
t)+γλ1εt + mt + vt =0 . (43)
To solve for expected money growth, I take expectations of (43) at t − 1. This gives
f m
e
t = γλ1α0. (44)
Next, I substitute (44) into (43). The rule for money growth becomes
f mt = γλ1α0 −
γλ1
1+γ2λ1
εt − vt. (45)
This gives inﬂation as




and open unemployment becomes




21Expected open unemployment, the ﬁrst term in (47), increases compared to the case with
discretionary policy for both ALMPs and money growth, since







α0λ1 (1 + α1)
λ0 + λ1 (1 + α1)
> 0.
For crowding-in eﬀects, discretionary policy implies too low a size of ALMPs and too
high open unemployment. Thus a commitment of ALMPs to zero is even worse, since
this results in even higher open unemployment. For crowding-out eﬀects, the size of
ALMPs is too large under discretionary policy, but open unemployment decreases since
the crowding-out eﬀect is less than one to one. A commitment of ALMPs to zero thus
increases open unemployment.
The government’s incentive to create surprise inﬂation in order to reduce open un-
employment after wage contracts have been concluded is thus strengthened. Expected
inﬂation under commitment to zero ALMPs is then higher than when both policies were
set in a discretionary way. More speciﬁcally,









1α0 (1 + α1)
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> 0.
The ability to commit ALMPs means that the entire stabilization of demand and sup-
ply shocks takes place through monetary policy and, thus, through variations in inﬂation.
The coeﬃcient before εt in (46) is larger compared to the case when both policies were
set in a discretionary way, i.e., the response of inﬂation to supply shocks is increased.
The second term in (47) is the eﬀect of a supply shock on open unemployment. The
coeﬃcient is now larger than in the discretionary case. This means that the eﬀect of
supply shocks on open unemployment increases, since monetary policy is then the only
instrument available; monetary policy and labor market policy can no longer be used so
that the costs are equalized at the margin.
Demand shocks are still completely stabilized with money growth.




















To investigate if the government can achieve a lower expected loss if there are no insti-
tutions for labor market policy, I compare the expected losses under the simple rule and
under discretionary policy:
V
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22(i)F o rc r o w d i n g - i ne ﬀects, V d − e V< 0 is always valid, i.e. government welfare is
always higher when both monetary and labor market policies are discretionary. There are
three reasons for this: (i)W h e nA L M P sh a v ep o s i t i v ee ﬀects on employment, discretion
means too small ALMPs. But if ALMPs are committed to zero as under the simple
rule, this means an even lower size of ALMPs. (ii) Because zero ALMPs means higher
unemployment than under discretion, inﬂation is increased. (iii) Shocks in the economy
are stabilized to a smaller extent when ALMPs are committed to zero.
(ii) For crowding-out eﬀects, the sign of V d − e V is ambiguous, since the ﬁrst three
terms in (48) are negative, but the fourth term may be positive. However, for crowding-
out eﬀects in the interval −1
2 < α1 < 0, then V d− e V< 0i sa l w a y sv a l i d ,a st h i sg u a r a n t e e s
that the fourth term is negative. Then the expected loss is smaller under discretionary
policy for both ALMPs and money growth than under commitment to zero for ALMPs.
The reason is that for low crowding-out eﬀects, the positive bias in ALMPs is low as is
the gain from committing ALMPs to zero. Then, the cost of less stabilization of shocks
and higher inﬂation outweighs the beneﬁt of removing the bias in ALMPs.
(iii) If the crowding-out eﬀects are in the interval −1
2 < α1 < 0, then the fourth term
is positive, and it is possible that V d − e V> 0. For large crowding-out eﬀects, there is
a large positive bias in ALMPs. It may then be the case that the beneﬁt of eliminating
the positive bias in ALMPs outweighs the loss of relinquishing ALMPs as a stabilization
policy and the cost of higher inﬂation.
It can be shown that plausible parameter values might result in a welfare gain from
commitment of ALMPs to zero. This will for instance, occur if I set α0 =0 .1, λ0 =1 .7,
λ1 =1 .5, γ =0 .8, α1 = −0.9a n dσ2
ε =0 .0002. These values give an average inﬂation of
0.12 and an average open unemployment of 0.1.
4 Delegation of monetary and labor market policy to
independent agencies
A well-known solution to the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy is that mon-
etary policy decisions should be delegated to an independent conservative central bank,
which can resist the political pressure to create inﬂation (Rogoﬀ, 1985). This approach
assumes delegation of policy to a bank with the same loss function as the government,
but with a lower weight on unemployment. This reduces the average inﬂation bias, but,
a tt h es a m et i m e ,a l s ot h ed e g r e eo fs t a b i l i z a tion of shocks. Another proposed solution
23is to delegate monetary policy to a central bank which has the same loss function as the
government, but which also takes into account that it will suﬀer an extra cost for creat-
ing inﬂation, according to a so-called optimal linear contract with the government. The
optimal-linear contract removes the average inﬂation bias without any cost in terms of less
stabilization and solves the commitment problem (Walsh, 1995; Persson and Tabellini,
1993). A third approach to the commitment problem of monetary policy is an inﬂation-
targeting regime (Svensson, 1997). This can be interpreted as the delegation of monetary
policy to a central bank with a diﬀerent inﬂation target than the government. This can
also eliminate the average inﬂation bias, without aﬀecting the stabilization of shocks.
It might thus seem as if the optimal-contract and inﬂation-target approaches were
the obvious ways of solving the time-inconsistency problem of monetary policy and that
similar approaches solve the time-inconsistency problem of labor market policy.4 There
are also serious objections however. For instance, the optimal-contract approach just
assumes that the contract can always be enforced. But if the government can assign a
contract to the central bank, it can also revise the contract before monetary policy is
determined. If there are costs of revising the conditions of the contract or the contract
itself, delegation reduces the inﬂation bias, but the bias will not be eliminated unless the
costs are prohibitive. Thus, if the decision on delegation is discretionary, the credibility
problem of monetary policy is only mitigated (Jensen, 1997).
The inﬂation-target approach can be interpreted in two ways. One interpretation is
that under an inﬂation-target regime, the government assigns a loss function with a spe-
ciﬁc inﬂation target to the central bank. The problem is then that the central bank is
a s s u m e dt oa c ta c c o r d i n gt ot h ea s s i g n e dl o s sfunction, even though no incentive mech-
anism has been designed. The other interpretation is that the government identiﬁes a
central banker with certain preferences, so that the appointed central banker achieves the
desired outcome for inﬂation. But identifying a central banker with a lower inﬂation goal
than the government but with the same relative weight on deviations from the inﬂation
goal, would seem to require more information than might reasonably be assumed. One
might possibly identify central bankers who are more inﬂation-adverse than the govern-
ment, but how does one distinguish between the intercept (the inﬂation goal) and the
slope coeﬃcient (the relative weight) ?
4 For instance, it is easy to show that if linear contracts are added to the loss functions of the labor
market board and the central bank, the bias in ALMPs and inﬂation is removed. The loss for the central
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24I shall follow the ”Rogoﬀ” approach of letting the government delegate the conduct of
active labor market policy and monetary policy to independent agencies, with the same
loss functions as society, but, possibly, with diﬀerent weights on open unemployment. The
reason for my choice is that the cost associated with ﬁring the heads of the central bank
and the labor market board is likely to be greater than the cost of revising contracts and
goals, which will make the problem of discretion with respect to delegation of policies
less serious. Moreover, it might only be possible to determine if an individual cares more
or less about open unemployment relative to the speciﬁc goals for inﬂation and ALMPs.
This approach is also consistent with my model, in the sense that I have not allowed for
diﬀerent goals for inﬂation and ALMPs (the goals are just set to zero).
I will be studying the following examples. First, monetary policy is delegated to an
independent central bank, whereas labor market policy is still conducted by the govern-
ment. Second, I will let labor market policy, but not monetary policy, be delegated to an
independent national labor market board. Finally, I will study simultaneous delegation
of both monetary policy and labor market policy to independent agencies.
4.1 Independent central bank and discretionary labor market
policy
At the beginning of the period, monetary policy is delegated to an independent central
bank. The central bank’s weight is λ
cb
1 and society’s weight is λ1.
The timing is thus; (i) the institutional framework is decided, i.e., a decision is taken
about the central banker to whom monetary policy should appropriately be delegated;
(ii) private-sector agents form expectations of re
t and me
t;( iii)t h ev a l u e so fvt and εt are
observed by the policymakers; (iv) money growth and ALMPs are decided simultaneously
by the central bank and the government; and (v) macroeconomic outcomes are realized.
T h ea p p o i n t m e n ti st h u st h ec h o i c eo ft h ew e i g h tλ
cb
1 . The private sector observes
λ
cb
1 and forms its expectations accordingly. After being appointed, the central banker
determines the monetary policy in a discretionary way at stage (iv), according to his
preferences. The problem can thus be solved like the problem in section 2.2, except for
the weight on open unemployment which now is the central banker’s weight. Then the
decision of the optimal weight is the choice of a weight minimizing the society’s expected
loss. Thus, the problem is solved ”backwards”. First, the optimal policy given the central
banker’s weight is derived and then, the optimal weight minimizing the expected loss.
The problem for the central bank is to decide on money growth such that the actual
25loss is minimized. This amounts to the same ﬁrst-order condition for money growth as
under discretion except that the weight on open unemployment is now the central bank’s
weight instead of society’s. This will give the same structural decision rule for money
growth as under discretionary policies, (33), except that λ1 is now replaced by λ
cb
1 .
The government decides on ALMPs in a discretionary way. This gives a ﬁrst-order
condition for rt equal to (24). The structural decision rule for ALMPs is equal to (29),
i.e., the same rule as under discretionary policy for money growth and ALMPs. Then. I











1 λ0 + λ0 + λ1
εt, (49)
which is expressed both in terms of the central bank’s and society’s weight on open
unemployment. To ﬁnd the rule for money growth, I insert the rule for ALMPs into the






























1 λ0 + λ0 + λ1
εt. (51)
To ﬁnd the optimal weight on open unemployment for the independent central bank,
I evaluate the expected loss, since monetary policy is delegated before the shocks are
realized. The decision rules (49) and (50) are evaluated in the society’s loss function. The















































I then take the derivative with respect to the central bank’s weight on open unemployment

































1 λ0 + λ0 + λ1
´3 σ
2
ε =0 . (52)
Equation (52) is a fourth-order equation in λ
cb
1 , which is diﬃcult to solve. Therefore, I
evaluate the derivative at the points λ
cb
1 =0a n dλ
cb
1 > λ1. The ﬁrst term is zero when
26λ
cb
1 =0 , and the second term is negative. Hence, the derivative is negative. For λ
cb
1 > λ1,
the derivative is positive. The optimal weight is then in the interval 0 < λ
cb
1 < λ1.T h i s
gives the familiar result that a conservative central banker with a lower weight on open
unemployment than society, should be appointed. This result is valid for crowding-out
eﬀects as well as for crowding-in eﬀects of ALMPs.5
A lower weight on open unemployment implies that average inﬂation decreases, i.e.,
that the ﬁrst term in (51) decreases. Monetary policy stabilizes supply shocks less when
λ
cb
1 decreases; this is the second term in (51). The ﬁrst term in (49) is the average size of
ALMPs, which is unaﬀected by the central bank’s weight on open unemployment. ALMPs
stabilize supply shocks more when the central bank’s weight on open unemployment de-
creases, since the coeﬃcient for εt in (49) decreases in λ
cb
1 . The central bank fully stabilizes
demand shocks, since there is no goal conﬂict between inﬂation and open unemployment
for the central bank either.
4.2 Independent labor market board and discretionary mone-
tary policy
The next example shows delegation of labor market policy to an independent labor market
board, with the same loss function as society, but with the weight λ
a
1 on open unemploy-
ment.
The timing is thus; (i) the institutional framework is decided, i.e., a decision is taken
to whom ALMPs should be delegated; (ii) private-sector agents form expectations of re
t
and me
t;( iii)t h ev a l u e so fvt and εt are observed by the policymakers; (iv)A L M P sa n d
money growth are chosen simultaneously by the labor market board and the government;
and (v) macroeconomic outcomes are realized.
The problem is solved in a similar way as when monetary policy is delegated, that is,
backwards.
The independent labor market board determines ALMPs in a discretionary way. The
minimization problem is the same as under discretionary policy for both ALMPs and
money growth. Hence, the ﬁrst-order condition is equal to (24) except that λ1 is replaced
by λ
a
1. Thus, the structural decision rule for the labor market board is equal to (29),
except for the weight. The government determines monetary policy with society’s weight
on open unemployment in the loss function. The ﬁrst-order condition for money growth







is positive for 0 < λ
cb
1 < λ1.
27is equal to (25). Thus, the structural decision rule for money growth is equal to (33). I
solve for the reduced form decision rules, by combining the government’s rule for money
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To ﬁnd the optimal weight for the labor market board, I evaluate the expected social loss
when ALMPs are determined by an independent labor market board and money growth
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Like equation (52), this derivative is a fourth-order equation in λ
a
1,w h i c hi ti sd i ﬃcult
to solve. Instead, I once more evaluate the derivative at extreme values for the weight.
But, it is then generally diﬃcult to analytically verify that the second-order derivative is
positive in the relevant interval or at the optimal value of λ
a
1. However, I still analyze the
derivative at the extreme values, to understand what the possible solutions are.
At λ
a
































For crowding-in eﬀects, (55) is negative when λ
a
1 < λ1.F o rλ
a
1 > λ1, the second term
is negative, while the other terms are positive. Thus, if there is a solution, must to be
at a value of λ
a
1 > λ1, since the derivative might then change signs and become positive.
28Therefore, the optimal appointment may be to a liberal labor market board. The intuition
for this is that the time inconsistency problem for both inﬂation and ALMPs are reduced,
since the size of ALMPs are too low for crowding-in eﬀects under discretion compared
to under commitment. When λ
a
1 increases, the average size of ALMPs (the ﬁrst term in
(53)) increases and open unemployment decreases. This reduces the incentive to inﬂate,
i.e., the ﬁrst term in (54) decreases.
F o rc r o w d i n g - o u te ﬀects, the optimal delegation may be either to a conservative or
to a liberal central bank. When λ
a
1 < λ1, the sign of the derivative (55) is ambiguous,
since the second term may be positive, while the other terms are negative. A condition






Then, the social loss is reduced if labor market policy is delegated to a liberal labor market
board. The intuition for appointing a liberal labor market board, despite the fact that
the time inconsistency problem for ALMPs deteriorates, is that an increase in the size of
average ALMP reduces open unemployment. The temptation to inﬂate the economy then
decreases, as it is positively related to the rate of open unemployment.
If inequality (56) is not satisﬁed, then the second term is positive when λ
a
1 < λ1.I f
the second term dominates the other terms, the derivative, (55), can be positive when
λ
a
1 < λ1. Then, the optimal weight for the labor market board is less than the society’s
weight. A lower λ
a
1 reduces the ﬁrst term in (53), but increases the ﬁrst term in (54). For
large crowding-out eﬀects when the bias in ALMPs is large, the beneﬁt of a reduction in
the bias in ALMPs may be larger than the cost of the increase in the inﬂation bias.
I shall use the numerical values from section 3.1t oe x e m p l i f yt h ea b o v es t a t e m e n t s .
The solution to the fourth-order equation is such that there are two imaginary solutions
and two real solutions. One real solution is positive and one is negative. Since I have
restricted the weights to be positive, the positive real root is the solution. In Table 3, the
results (the positive real root) from the numerical exercise are shown and the second-order
derivative is positive at these optimal values.
The results show that one might get a liberal labor market board even when ALMPs
have crowding-out eﬀects on employment. The average values of ALMPs, inﬂation and
open unemployment, when labor market policy is delegated and monetary policy is dis-
cretionary, are shown in Table 4.
There is a trade oﬀ between reducing the biases and stabilization, since a change
29Crowding-in or crowding-out
Parameter values α1 =0 .3 α1 = −0.1 α1 = −0.4 α1 = −0.9
α0 =0 .05 λ0 =1 .7
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Table 3: The degree of open unemployment aversion for the labor market board when labor market
policy is delegated and monetary policy is discretionary
Crowding-in or crowding-out
Parameter values α1 =0 .3 α1 = −0.1 α1 = −0.4 α1 = −0.9
α0 =0 .05 λ0 =1 .7
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Table 4: Average ALMPs, inﬂation and open unemployment when labor market policy is delegated and
monetary policy is discretionary
in the weight on open unemployment alters the stabilization of shocks. For instance, a
conservative labor market board stabilizes supply shock less with ALMPs and inﬂation
then tends to stabilize supply shocks more, in comparison with a liberal labor market
board.
4.3 Independent central bank and labor market board
Finally, I analyze simultaneous delegation of monetary policy and labor market policy to
independent agencies. I assume that the central bank determines money growth and the
labor market board determines ALMP. The weight on open unemployment for the central
bank is λ
cb
1 and for the labor market board, λ
a
1.
The timing is thus; (i) the institutional framework is decided, i.e., delegation of mon-
etary policy and labor market policy; (ii) private-sector agents form expectations of re
t
and me
t;( iii)t h ev a l u e so fvt and εt are observed by the policymakers; (iv)m o n e yg r o w t h
and ALMP are chosen simultaneously by the central bank and the labor market board;
and (v) macroeconomic outcomes are realized.
The minimization problem for the central bank is equal to the minimization problem
30for the independent central bank in section 4.1. The structural rule for money growth
is therefore identical to the structural rule under discretion, (33), except that the weight
is now the central banker’s weight. Moreover, the minimization problem for the labor
market board is equal to the problem for the independent board in section 4.2. This gives
the structural decision rule equal to (29), except that λ1 is replaced with λ
a
1. The reduced
form rules are solved for by combining the structural rules for the central bank and the








































Next, I evaluate the social expected loss with society’s weights on open unemployment,
but with the decision rules for the independent labor market board and central bank. The

























































To ﬁnd the optimal weight for the independent labor market board, I take the deriva-
tive with respect to λ
a












































































Again, the derivative is a fourth-order equation in λ
a
1, which it is diﬃcult to solve analyt-
ically.

























































The solution to the two fourth-order equations should be such that both equations
are fulﬁlled at the same time. It is diﬃcult to draw any general conclusions from the
31two equations. I shall therefore evaluate the derivatives for my numerical examples. The
solution to the two fourth-order equations are pairs of roots. Two pairs of roots involve
real solutions and the relevant solution is the pair where both roots are positive. The
second-order suﬃcient conditions for a minimum is fulﬁlled for the relevant solutions6.I n
Tables 5 and 6, it is shown that one can get diﬀerent outcomes for delegation of monetary






α0 =0 .05 λ0 =1 .7 λ1 =1 .5
γ =0 .8 σ2
ε =0 .0002 α1 =0 .3 1.91 0.15
α0 =0 .05 λ0 =1 .7 λ1 =1 .5
γ =0 .8 σ2
ε =0 .0002 α1 = −0.1
1.36 0.09
α0 =0 .05 λ0 =1 .7 λ1 =1 .5
γ =0 .8 σ2
ε =0 .0002 α1 = −0.4
0.93 0.067
α0 =0 .05 λ0 =1 .7 λ1 =1 .5
γ =0 .8 σ2
ε =0 .0002 α1 = −0.9
0.22 0.073






α0 =0 .1 λ0 =1 .7 λ1 =1 .5
γ =0 .8 σ2
ε =0 .0002 α1 =0 .3 1.94 0.044
α0 =0 .1 λ0 =1 .7 λ1 =1 .5
γ =0 .8 σ2
ε =0 .0002 α1 = −0.1 1.35 0.025
α0 =0 .1 λ0 =1 .7 λ1 =1 .5
γ =0 .8 σ2
ε =0 .0002 α1 = −0.4 0.91 0.018
α0 =0 .1 λ0 =1 .7 λ1 =1 .5
γ =0 .8 σ2
ε =0 .0002 α1 = −0.9 0.17 0.022
Table 6: Numerical examples of delegation of monetary policy and labor market policy
For crowding-in eﬀects, the optimal delegation is a delegation to a liberal labor market
board and a conservative central bank. The intuition is that the biases in both ALMPs
and inﬂation are reduced when λ
a
1 increases, i.e., the ﬁrst term in (57) increases and the
ﬁrst term in (58) decreases. In addition, a lower λ
cb
1 reduces the inﬂation bias further.
For small crowding-out eﬀects, my earlier parameter values give that the optimal
delegation is to a conservative labor market board and to a conservative central bank.
However, if the weight on open unemployment is increased and the weight on ALMPs


































α0 =0 .05 λ0 =0 .7 λ1 =2
γ =0 .8 σ2
ε =0 .0002 α1 = −0.1 2.32 0.11
Table 7: Delegation to a liberal LMB and a conservative CB
is decreased in the government’s loss function, the delegation of labor market policy can
then be made to a liberal labor market board and the delegation of monetary policy to a
conservative central bank, see table 7 .
The intuition behind a conservative LMB is that the positive bias in ALMPs is increas-
ing in λ
a
1 and the inﬂation bias is decreasing in λ
a
1. Thus, a conservative board reduces the
bias in ALMP, but increases the inﬂation bias. To reduce the inﬂation bias, the central
bank’s weight is lower than society’s and the board’s. As explained earlier, the intuition
for a liberal board is that it reduces the inﬂation bias, even though the time inconsistency
problem in ALMPs deteriorates.
For moderate and large crowding-out eﬀects, the optimal delegation is to a conservative
central bank and a conservative labor market board. The intuition behind a conservative
LMB and a conservative CB is the same as above.
The trade-oﬀ between stabilization of shocks and reduction of the biases is also present
when both monetary and labor market policy are delegated. But it is then diﬃcult to
determine how stabilization is aﬀected when both labor-market policy and monetary
policy are delegated, as compared to discretionary policy for both. For instance, when
both policies are delegated to conservative agencies, the conservative board stabilizes
supply shocks less with ALMPs, which tends to increase the stabilization of supply shocks
with inﬂation. But at the same time, a conservative bank stabilizes supply shock less
with inﬂation and this increases the stabilization with ALMPs compared to discretionary
policy.
The average values of open unemployment, inﬂation and ALMPs, when both policies
are delegated, are shown in Tables 8, 9 and 10.
The labor market board is always more liberal than the central bank and the central
bank is always conservative. Even when looking at extreme cases, it is not possible to
generate a liberal central bank, even though that case cannot be analytically ruled out.
If the cost of inﬂation is very low relative to the cost of open unemployment and ALMPs
in the governments loss function or/and if the variance of the supply shock is large, this
would strenghten the case for a liberal central bank. For instance, even if the weight on
inﬂation is 1,000,000 times smaller than the other weights, the bank does not become
33Parameter values E (ut) E (πt) E (rt)
α0 =0 .05 λ0 =1 .7 λ1 =1 .5
γ =0 .8 α1 =0 .3 λ
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γ =0 .8 α1 = −0.1 λ
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γ =0 .8 α1 = −0.4 λ
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γ =0 .8 α1 = −0.9 λ
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Table 8: Average values of open unemployment, inﬂation and ALMPs, when both monetary and labor
market policy are delegated
Parameter values E (ut) E (πt) E (rt)
α0 =0 .1 λ0 =1 .7 λ1 =1 .5
γ =0 .8 α1 =0 .3 λ
cb




α0 =0 .1 λ0 =1 .7 λ1 =1 .5
γ =0 .8 α1 = −0.1 λ
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α0 =0 .1 λ0 =1 .7 λ1 =1 .5
γ =0 .8 α1 = −0.4 λ
cb




α0 =0 .1 λ0 =1 .7 λ1 =1 .5
γ =0 .8 α1 = −0.9 λ
cb




Table 9: Average values of open unemployment, inﬂation and ALMPs, when both monetary and labor
market policy are delegated
liberal. When I increase the variance of the supply shock, the central bank gradually
becomes less conservative but it never becomes liberal.
The intuition for this is that the inﬂation bias is decreasing in the labor market board’s
weight on open unemployment. This gives an incentive for choosing a less conservative
LMB in order to reduce the inﬂation bias. At the same time, there is no interaction
between the central bank’s weight on open unemployment and the bias in ALMPs. This
means that there is no incentive to make the central bank liberal, in order to reduce
the bias in ALMPs. Furthermore, a liberal central bank means increased stabilization of
supply shocks with inﬂation and less stabilization with ALMPs and if the cost of inﬂation
is low compared to the cost of ALMPs, this could result in a liberal CB. This eﬀect is
Parameter values E (ut) E (πt) E (rt)
α0 =0 .05 λ0 =0 .7 λ1 =2
γ =0 .8 α1 = −0.1 λ
cb




Table 10: Average values of open unemployment, inﬂation and ALMPs when the labor market board
is liberal and the central bank is conservative
34obviously not strong enough to make the central bank liberal, however.
The simultaneous delegation of labor market and monetary policy can be summarized
in Table 11:
Delegation to:
Eﬀects of ALMP: Labor Market Board Central Bank
Crowding-in liberal conservative
Low crowding-out liberal/conserv. conservative
Moderate crowding-out conservative conservative
Large crowding-out conservative conservative
Table 11: Simultaneous delegation of labor market policy and monetary policy
5S u m m a r y
Both active labor market policy and monetary policy suﬀer from a time-inconsistency
problem. In models of time inconsistency problems for monetary policy, there is a pos-
itive inﬂation bias under discretion. The bias in ALMPs under discretion can either be
positive or negative. If ALMPs increase wages and have a crowding-out eﬀect on reg-
ular employment, the bias in ALMPs is positive. If ALMPs reduce wages and have a
crowding-in eﬀect on employment, the bias is negative.
A monetary-policy commitment to zero money growth eliminates the inﬂation bias. A
country that has committed its monetary policy in this way, only uses labor market policy
as a stabilization instrument. It stabilizes both supply and demand shocks less than a
country using both monetary and labor market policy, since ALMPs and monetary policy
are imperfect substitutes when it comes to stabilizing shocks. A monetary-policy com-
mitment may thus improve the utility for the government, if the beneﬁt from eliminating
the inﬂation bias is larger than the cost of being less able to stabilize shocks.
A country with a labor market policy committed to zero has a higher expected inﬂation
rate and higher expected open unemployment than a country using both monetary policy
and labor market policy in a discretionary way. Thus, the commitment of labor market
policy increases the time inconsistency problem for monetary policy.
If ALMPs have crowding-in eﬀects and low or moderate crowding-out eﬀects, the
discretionary conduct of both labor market policy and monetary policy gives a lower
expected loss compared to a situation with commitment of labor market policy. But for
ALMPs with large crowding-out eﬀects, the advantage of from eliminating a large positive
35bias in ALMPs, may outweigh the cost of higher inﬂation, higher open unemployment and
less stabilization of shocks.
In models of monetary policy, delegating monetary policy to an independent conser-
vative central bank is one way of improving the discretionary outcome. In Table 12, the
























crowding-out cons. CB cons. LMB
cons. LMB
cons. CB
Table 12: Summary of delegation of monetary policy and labor market policy
Delegation of labor market policy when monetary policy is discretionary can be made
either to a conservative or to a liberal labor market board. For ALMPs that have crowding-
in eﬀects, delegation to a liberal labor market board always improves the utility for
the government. For ALMPs with low to moderate crowding-out eﬀects, the optimal
delegation is to a liberal labor market board, even though this deteriorates the time
inconsistency problem for labor market policy, since it reduces the inﬂation bias. For
ALMPs with large crowding-out eﬀects, the delegation is made to a conservative labor
market board, since the bias in ALMPs is then large and a conservative board reduces
this bias. This eﬀect weighs more heavily in this case than the increase of the inﬂation
bias.
When labor market policy is discretionary, monetary policy is always delegated to a
conservative central bank.
Delegation of both labor market policy and monetary policy gives similar results as
when each policy is delegated independently. However, the labor market board is less likely
to be liberal for ALMPs with crowding-out eﬀects, since the conservative central bank
then reduces the inﬂation bias and the incentive for choosing a liberal labor market board
is weakened. The possibility of a liberal central banker cannot be ruled out analytically,
but I have not succeeded in constructing numerical examples where this occurs. In all my
36examples, monetary policy is delegated to a conservative central banker and the central
bank is also always more conservative than the labor market board.
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